The Effect of Vertical Structure on Exchange Rate Pass-through by Yushi Yoshida
Revised Revised Revised Revised









(First Draft: May 30, 1997)1









[Abstract] [Abstract] [Abstract] [Abstract]
We introduce an explicit incorporation of local distributors in an analysis of pricing
behavior of exporting firms in the pricing-to-market literature.   We examine pricing
behaviors of exporting firms under four different cases of vertical structure; in the case
of an independent local distributor and in the cases of local distributors vertically
restricted in three forms.    From our theoretical model we find that the form of vertical
structure for exporting firms has a significant effects on exchange rate pass-through.
Since the measure of pass-through has not been distinguished between wholesale price
and consumer price in previous researches, we conclude that the reported values of
pass-through from previous researches only capture the partial pricing behavior of
traded goods.  We suggest that further empirical investigation in pass-through
associated with consumer price is necessary for complete understanding of the pricing
behavior of traded goods.
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1. Introduction 1. Introduction 1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The products of manufacturers go through various stages before purchased by final
consumers.  For example, a movie film produced by a studio (manufacturer) in
Hollywood will be distributed by both domestic and foreign film distributors
(wholesalers) to local movie theaters (retailers) all over the world.    As a final consumer
we can consume these products in different final forms; we go to see a movie at theater
or pick up a video at a rental shop.    These vertical structures can be in different forms
among different industries and at different points of time in the same industry.
As observed in the above example, in international trade the manufactured goods
must go through distributors of a destination country.  What distinguishes the
manufacturers in providing a film to the domestic film distributors, on the one hand,
and the foreign film distributors, on the other, is the presence of fluctuating nominal
exchange rate in international trade.    In response to exchange rate fluctuations, many
empirical evidences have accumulated to confirm the claim that the exporter conducts
different pricing strategies for different national markets.    For example, in his panel
regression for the export pricing by U.S. and German exporters, Knetter (1989) found
the importing country effects significant.  Knetter, therefore, concludes that these
exporters employ pricing-to-market strategies, termed by Krugman (1987)
1.  Similar
evidences are found in Ohno (1989), Marston (1990), Hung, Kim and Ohno (1993) and
Gagnon and Knetter (1995).
Despite the fact that these research only focus on the behavior of exporters, the role
of import distributors in international trade is also recognized in the literature to
influence the magnitude of exchange rate pass-through.    For example, from indirect
evidences of exchange rate coefficient being significant in the import deflator equation
but not significant in the consumption deflator, Woo (1984) conclude that dealers of
foreign products also engage in adjustment of markup over cost with exchange rate
fluctuations.   Also, Kasa (1992) notes a caveat that the use of a marketing subsidiary
by a parent firm may bias the estimation of pass-through in his paper.    More strikingly,
Gagnon and Knetter (1995) find direct evidence of retailers for Japanese and German
                                                  
1 Seminal papers on pricing-to-market literature and pass-through literature are
Krugman (1987) and Dornbusch (1987).    Among others, Baldwin (1988), Baldwin and
Krugman (1989) and Dixit (1989) uses a model in a dynamic framework; Froot and
Klemperer (1989) with a market share model; Kasa (1992) with an adjustment cost
model.    For the survey, see Yoshida (1997).3
automobile adjusting markup with exchange rate fluctuations.    With limited number
of products, Yoshida (1994) conducts co-integration analysis between wholesale price
and consumer price of imports in Japan.  These research, nonetheless, lacked a
concrete model of vertical structure in international trade settings.
Lacking vertical structures in a model, it is not obvious how the form of vertical
structure affects the level of exchange rate pass-through.  More precisely, the
literature does not provide a clear description of what happens to the exchange rate
pass-through if an exporter, previously relying on an independent foreign distributor,
sets up its own subsidiary distributor in a foreign country.    This can be very important
aspect from the view of foreign direct investment literature.    In order to answer these
questions in a satisfactory manner, we need to construct a model with an explicit
incorporation of distributors in international trade.  After setting up a vertical
structure model, we give the first explicit analysis of the effect of vertical structure on
exchange rate pass-through.
Simultaneously, another complication arises when one focuses closely into the
vertical structure of international trade.  With international trade involving local
distributors, there are two different export prices; wholesale price determined between
exporters and distributors and retail price set between distributors and consumers.
Exchange rate pass-through must be clearly defined with these export prices
respectively in order to gain a correct assessment on the export price behavior.    The
effect of vertical structure on exchange rate pass-through is distinguished for these
export prices in our analysis.
Conforming to the literature, we concentrate on industries with differentiated
products in the followings; we assume that manufactures are monopolistic exporters.
In addition, we assume that there is a single distributor for an exporter, although we
later discuss how far we can relax this assumption without alternating the major
results.
2    It is natural to assume that the sole distributor marketing the differentiated
products can also act as a monopolist in the final market.
3  What we observe in this
industry is, then, the international version of successive monopolies. In the successive
                                                  
2 For example, the same results can be obtained for multiple distributors, if each
distributor is only allowed to deal in his exclusive territory.
3 The nature of imported goods often make themselves differentiated products in the
market.    The name of country where the imports are manufactured often reflects as a
‘brand’ to the consumers.    See Froot and Klemperer (1989) for their discussion on
brand.4
monopolies literature it is well-established that a monopolistic firm has incentive to
integrate vertically forward, see Spengler (1950).   The upstream firm (manufacture)
can gain extra rents from eliminating negative externality of a higher price than
monopoly price by vertically integrating forward with the downstream firm.
The various forms of vertical restraints instead of vertical integration can be also
implemented to achieve the same outcome for the manufacturers.    In the following
analysis we consider the effects of vertical integration, franchise contract, and resale
price maintenance on exchange rate pass-through.  Franchise contract, in which
franchisee follows fixed royalty fee and revenue sharing, can be used to eliminate the
vertical externality which emerges for the case when both upstream firm and
downstream firm must contribute to such quality improving input as advertisements
4.
Mathewson and Winter (1985) provides in a general setting when franchising contract
is necessary to avoid free-riding problem for a vertical relation.  The economic
incentive for the use of resale price maintenance is given in Mathewson and Winter
(1983), Marvel and McCafferty (1984) and Romano (1994).    In general the sales efforts
made by retailers produce positive horizontal externality, therefore, there is a free-rider
problem for the exporter.   Resale price maintenance can be used to eliminate this
problem among retailers.
In the following section we present our successive monopolies model with a few
formal assumptions.   In section 3 we distinguish two measures of exchange rate pass-
through with regard to wholesale level price and consumer level price.    These two
different measures have not been clearly distinguished in the literature.    We derive
these pass-through measures for different settings of vertical structure, between
independent firms and between vertically integrated firms.    In section 4 we summarize
how the vertical structure affects the size of exchange rate pass-through under the
general demand form and under a linear-demand form.    From our theoretical model we
find that the form of vertical structure for exporting firms has a significant effects on
exchange rate pass-through.  Section 5 reconsiders the framework of successive
monopolies and discusses how far our analysis can be extended to a more general
setting without altering the result obtained in this paper.    In the concluding section,
we discuss the implication of our results relating to the previous studies in the
literature of pass-through and pricing-to-market.    Overall message of this paper is that
we need further investigations on exchange rate pass-through with regard to consumer
                                                  
4 Mathewson and Winter (1985) notes that franchising accounts for approximately one-
third of total retail sales in the United States and Canada.5
price in order to obtain a general description of export price behavior.
2. The Model of Successive Monopolies 2. The Model of Successive Monopolies 2. The Model of Successive Monopolies 2. The Model of Successive Monopolies
We assume an exporter as a monopoly selling his products in a foreign market
through a single local distributor.   The exporter faces a constant marginal cost for
producing his product and sets a wholesale price in terms of the home currency.   The
foreign distributor, on the other hand, takes as a marginal cost the wholesale price
denominated in the foreign currency and becomes a single supplier of the product in the
local market.   For simplicity, we assume for the foreign distributor without a loss of
generality that costs for distributing and adverting are zero
5.    These two firms together
contribute successive monopolies in international trade framework.















where the exchange rate, e, is expressed as the foreign price of home currency.   
U π and
D π  are the profits of the exporter and the distributor respectively.    q is the demand
function for the export products and p is the consumer price in the foreign currency.
W p  and c are the wholesale price and a constant marginal cost
7 in the home currency.
                                                  
5 The lack of cost function, besides purchasing cost from exporters, on distributors needs
a few remarks.   The presence of cost unresponsive to exchange rate changes is an
important determinant of incomplete pass-through.   Because the local production at
the export market is free of exchange rate shocks, Gron and Swenson (1996) estimated
pass-through coefficients of exporters with inclusion of the share of domestic production
and foreign production.   The presence of local distributors for exporters works in a
similar way with the local production for the exchange rate pass-through.   We have
examined our model with an explicit inclusion of a local constant marginal cost and
obtained the same result.    So we suppress this cost for the sake of clear exposition.
6  The pricing-to-market literature assumes that the exporter provides its supply for
both domestic market and export market.   However, the presence of domestic market
can be suppressed in the following analysis, if the marginal cost is constant.
7 In a more general form of cost function, we will have to come up with a more6
    For the information structure of the model, we assume throughout this paper that the
exporter has a perfect information of the profit function of the foreign distributor and
the demand function.    More precisely, we only need to require in the following analysis
that the exporter knows the foreign distributor’s perception of the demand function.
Although this is not a good approximation of the international trade environment, we
assume this information structure in order to exemplify the direct effects of vertical
structure on the exchange rate pass-through.   The exporter, for example, can be
thought to gain information on foreign market from purchasing the market research
report.
However, we need to assume a rather strict assumption on the form of the demand
function.
Assumption 1. [demand function]    The demand function is three times differentiable
and monotone decreasing in p.    Its first derivative is strictly decreasing and second
derivative is non-increasing in p.      qq p w h e r e q p qp =< ≤ () , ' () ' ' () 00 .
These assumptions are not unfamiliar; they are satisfied if the demand function is
concave.    The additional restriction on the third derivative is necessary to provide a
derived demand with similar properties of the original demand function.
Assumption 2. [demand function]  
'






The above assumption is somewhat awkward, however, since the sign of the right hand
side is negative, it is less strict a restriction than the one requiring the non-negativity of
the third derivative of demand with respect to price.   For example, the linear demand
function satisfies both assumptions.
We are now ready to provide the property of derived demand function for the exporter
in the following lemma.
                                                                                                                                                    
complicated form of assumptions.    Since our main concern is on the effect of vertical
integration upon exchange rate pass-through, we avoid unnecessary complications of
our model for the sake of exposition.7
Lemma 1. [derived demand]  With assumption 1, the derived demand,
q q ep q p ep WW == ()( () ) , of the distributor is strictly decreasing in  epW .  In  addition,
with assumption 2 the first derivative of the derived demand is non-increasing in  epW . 
  qe p q e p WW '( ) ''( ) <≤ 00 .
Proof:    See the appendix.
We note that these two assumptions are not necessary for our main conclusion, i.e.,
vertical structure matters for pass-through; they are only required to let us concentrate
on an incomplete exchange rate pass-through case which we are most likely to observe
in the accumulated evidences.    For example, if the demand function is more convex
than constant elasticity curve, we would observe an exchange rate pass-through
elasticity to be larger than unity.    In this case the price is showing more responses
than in a complete pass-through case.    Although we also sometimes encounter these
cases in some specific products or industries in empirical research, we would find it
difficult to be accepted as the model in the relatively long-run case.   Therefore, we
proceed to restrict our analysis in the rest of the paper with these assumptions.
With these assumptions formally stated now, we can examine the determination of
exchange rate pass-through in the successive monopolies model.    As we mentioned in
the introduction, in the successive monopolies model an upstream firm has incentive to
eliminate negative vertical externality by vertically integration or other vertical
restraints.    Whether an upstream firm may actually use these vertical restraints on
downstream firm mainly depends upon the cost of implementing these restraints
relative to the gain from elimination of negative externality.    Therefore, many research
in the literature of vertical integration focuses on the cost of integration and monitoring
in order to understand coexistence of vertically integration and vertically separation in
the economy (see e.g., Lafontaine and Slade (1996))
8.  In this paper, however, we
neglect this issue and focus on the effect of these various vertical restraints, if so chosen
by the exporter.  Our aim in this paper is, therefore, to describe how different vertical
structures affect the price movements with respect to exchange rate fluctuations.
                                                  
8 Bonanno and Vickers (1988), Maness (1996) and Lafontaine and Slade (1996, 1997)
investigate causes that influence the firm’s decision on whether to integrate or to
franchise.8
3. Exchange Rate Pass-through 3. Exchange Rate Pass-through 3. Exchange Rate Pass-through 3. Exchange Rate Pass-through
With the property of the derived demand function obtained above, the upstream firm
(exporter) maximizes its profit.   With our assumptions we conform the main result in
the pass-through literature that the wholesale price of imports in terms of the
importer’s currency does not fully reflect changes in the exchange rate.  In the
following analysis, we must, at first, define two measures of the exchange rate pass-
through and a complementary measure of pass-through: (ε
W ) exchange rate pass-
through on wholesale price; (ε
C ) exchange rate pass-through of consumer price;(η )
wholesale price pass-through on consumer price.
Definition. [exchange rate pass-through at different stages]   E x c h a n g e  r a t e  p a s s -
through of wholesale price (=ε
W ) (consumer price (=
C ε ))is defined as the ratio of the
proportional change in the wholesale (consumer) price in the foreign currency to the
proportional change in the exchange rate. Wholesale pass-through of consumer price
(=η ) is the ratio of the proportional change in the consumer price in the foreign


















W W C W C = = = ⋅ = η ε ε ε η ε
Most of the empirical work on the pass-through and pricing-to-market literature use
price measure of imports or exports from custom data and their measure of pass-
through, corresponding with our definition of
W ε .  However, we argued in the
introduction that interpreting international trade based only on this measure of pass-
through is misleading.   In the following analysis we will show formally how three
measures of pass-through would differ from each other.    We also show how various
vertical structures would influence these three measures of pass-through in the
following subsections (i) to (iv).
( ( ( (i) Independent monopolies i) Independent monopolies i) Independent monopolies i) Independent monopolies
In this subsection we derive the explicit terms for three measures of exchange rate
pass-through with two independent firms.    If an exporter decides to develop a new
market overseas, the exporter can contract with the existing foreign distributors or
establish its own distributor.    However, at the early stage of developing a new market,9
it is most likely for the exporter to rely on the existing foreign distributors.   This
corresponds to the case of two independent firms in our analysis.
The following two lemmas establish the property of three measures of exchange rate
pass-through when the manufacturer and the distributor are independent; all the pass-
through are less than unity are derived with our assumptions.
Lemma 2. [incomplete  ε
W  with two independent firms]      If a monopoly exporter and a
monopoly distributor are independent in their vertical relationship, with the demand
function satisfying assumption 1 and 2, the exchange rate pass-through of wholesale
price,
W ε , is incomplete, i.e., strictly less than unity.
1











Proof:   We first use the derived demand function to rewrite the profit function of the
upstream firm,  π
U
W pc q =− () .    The first order condition for optimizing the profit is,
ep q ecq q W '' −+ =0.  Totally differentiating this condition, we obtain
[ ' '' '' '] [ ' '' ' '' '] [ '] eq e p q e cq eq dp p q ep q cq ep cq p q de eq dc WW W W W W +− + + +− −+ −=
22 2 0.
Letting dc=0 and rearranging the terms, we obtain
dp
de
ep p c q p c q
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[( ) ' ' ' ]
2
2
0 2 .  The inequality is satisfied because we
use in addition to the property of the derived demand function that the equilibrium
wholesale price is higher than marginal cost.    Since the exchange rate pass-through is
defined in the foreign currency denomination, we obtain the derivative of the wholesale
price in the foreign currency with respect to the exchange rate,
0
] ' 2 ' ' ) ( [
'
] ' 2 ' ' ) ( [
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1.  For the first
inequality, we used  pc W > .    This proves the lemma. Q.E.D.
The most empirical studies in the pricing-to-market literature concentrate on the
empirical findings of the statements of the lemma above.    For example, Feenstra and
etc. (1996) use export unit values to measure exchange rate pass-through.    Kasa (1992)
uses custom data.    Their measures of exchange rate pass-through are 
W ε .  Before  the10
emergence of the pricing-to-market literature, there were, of course, numerous analyses
of pass-through with consumer price index
9.   However, no clear distinction was made
between these two values; they are often used as a proxy for each other.   Lemma 3
requires that we distinguish the two different pass-throughs in the analysis.
Lemma 3. [ 
W C ε ε <  with two independent firms] Moreover, the exchange rate pass-
through of consumer price is even smaller than the exchange rate pass-through of
wholesale price.
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This proves that the exchange rate pass-through of consumer price is smaller than the
pass-through of wholesale price. Q.E.D.
In deriving the relationship between two exchange rate pass-through, we also
established that all three forms of exchange rate pass-through are incomplete, since
W C ε η ε ⋅ = .
(ii) Vertical integration (ii) Vertical integration (ii) Vertical integration (ii) Vertical integration
In contrast to the previous subsection, the exporter might consider establishing its
own subsidiary distributor or vertically integrate forward with the foreign distributor,
for example, if it decides to continue to export to the foreign market after acquiring
enough shares in the market.    Without such losses as exiting from the market after
establishing specific investments in the foreign market, the upstream firm in the
successive monopolies has the incentive to vertically integrate forward with the
                                                  
9 However, the index used in the empirics consists of the consumer prices of domestic
goods as well.    It is obvious that one can not obtain a correct measure of exchange rate
pass-through with these indices.11
downstream firm.  After integration, the exporter can enjoy the joint profit
maximization.
The vertical integrated profit in terms of the foreign currency is expressed as follows,
π
VV V pc q e p =− () ( ) .  Although we could define the profit in terms of the foreign
currency as well, since price, quantity and pass-through obtained in the equilibrium are
the same under both definitions, we chose to express the profit in terms of the home
currency for convenience of exposition.    With the vertically integrated firms, we can
only define exchange rate pass-through of consumer price because there is no wholesale
price
10.
Lemma 4. [incomplete pass-through with vertical integration] If a monopoly exporter
and a monopoly distributor is vertically integrated, the exchange rate pass-through of
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1   (3)
proof:   The vertical integrated profit is  π
V pc q e p =− () ( ) , where p in this case is an
export price denominated in the home currency.    Note that we omit the superscript v in
this proof.  The first order condition for the profit isɹ 0 ' ) ( = + − q q c p e .  Totally
differentiating this condition, we obtain
( '' ' '' ') ( ' '' ' '' ') ( ') e pq eq e cq eq dp pq ep q cq ecpq pq de eq dc
22 2 0 + −+ + +− −+ − = .  Letting
dc=0 and rearranging the terms, we obtain 
dp
de
ep p c q p c q
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1.   W e  h a v e  p r o v e d  t h a t  t h e
pass-through elasticity is less than unity. Q.E.D.
We attempted to compare the size of exchange rate pass-through elasticities obtained
                                                  
10    The firm actually does have the wholesale price as an internal transfer price.    We
return to the determination of internal transfer price in subsection (vi).
11    In this lemma we deleted a superscript (v) on price for the convenience of exposition.12
in lemma 3 and lemma 4, however, we could not obtain unambiguous relationship
between them with our simple assumptions.    With an additional assumption of a linear
demand in section 4, we give an exact description of these relative sizes of pass-through
elasticity for different vertical structures.
(iii)  (iii)  (iii)  (iii) resale price maintenance resale price maintenance resale price maintenance resale price maintenance
The exporter can realize the integrated profit without integration by using other
vertical restraints.    In this subsection and the following, we consider how other vertical
restraints might affect the pass-through, namely resale price maintenance and
franchising.    Even though resale price maintenance is implemented when there is fear
of free-riding on horizontal externality generated by other distributors’ service inputs,
we suppress here the service inputs by distributor for the purpose of maintaining the
outcome comparable with other cases.    Resale price maintenance is a vertical restraint
in which an exporter enforces the common consumer price among distributors. (See
Mathewson and Winter (1983), Marvel and McCafferty (1984) and Romano (1994))    In
the case of single distributor considered in this paper, resale price maintenance is
equivalent to set the consumer price equal to the price determined by optimization of
vertically integrated firms profit, i.e.,  pe p e p W
V == .  We note that the consumer
price is not, contrary to the impression that the terms might suggest, maintained
constant with the fluctuating exchange rate.  Resale price maintenance is the
mechanism for an upstream to maintain common retail price among downstreams, but
it does not necessarily keep resale price constant intertemporally.
Lemma 5: [pass-through elasticities with resale price maintenance]   If an exporter
imposes resale price maintenance defined above, the exchange rate pass-through on
wholesale price and that on consumer price is equivalent to the exchange rate pass-
through on consumer price with the integrated firms.
Proof:   The exporter with imposition of resale price maintenance faces the same profit
function with the vertically integrated firms.  The exchange rate pass-through
elasticity of wholesale price is obviously equivalent with the exchange rate pass-through
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V == 1, it is also equivalent to that with the vertically integrated
firms. Q.E.D.
The result in lemma 5 is very obvious if we look at the definition of resale price
maintenance.    Since the consumer price is always adjusted equal to the wholesale price,
η must be unity.  This price equivalence also suggests that the exporter is directly
determining the final price for the consumers, and because this is the same
environment as in the vertically integrated firms’ case, we obtain the same exchange
rate pass-through on consumer price as in the vertically integrated case.
(iv)  (iv)  (iv)  (iv) franchising contract franchising contract franchising contract franchising contract
Another tool of vertical restraints for the exporter is to impose two-part tariff which
consists of a franchise fee and marginal price equal to marginal cost to the exporter (See
Mathewson and Winter (1985)).    As analogous to the previous subsection, we suppress
the service inputs by both exporter and distributor in order to maintain the outcome
comparable with other cases.    With a given exchange rate, e, the two-part tariff can be
written as follows;
p
D eF where ecq eF q T π max ) ( = + = .   The exporter leaves all
incentive to the distributor and absorbs all the rent by requiring fixed fee equal to the
profit of distributor.   With this two-part tariff, we rewrite the profit functions of the









Lemma 6: [pass-through elasticities with franchise fee]  If a monopoly exporter
imposes the two-part tariff defined above, the exchange rate pass-through on wholesale
price is complete and the exchange rate pass-through of consumer price is equivalent to
the one with the integrated firms.










W == 1 .   A change in the exchange rate will be fully passed onto the
whole sale price in terms of the foreign currency.    For the latter part in the lemma, we14
rearrange the profit function of the downstream firm,
eF q ec p q T pq
D − − = − = ) ( ) ( π .    Because the fixed portion of the two-part tariff does
not appear in the first condition, downstream firm profit maximization is equivalent to
that of the vertically integrated firms.    They differ only by the currency denomination.
The exactly same process in the proof of lemma 4 yields the exchange rate pass-through
elasticity of consumer price. Q.E.D.
We now derived pass-through for vertically independent firms, vertically integrated
firm, resale price maintenance and franchise contract.    Rather than concentrating on
explain why the exporter chooses a particular vertical structure among others, we
investigated how a particular vertical structure influences two measures of pass-
through.    In the following section, we summarize our results and discuss implications.
4. The Effects of Vertical Restraints on Exchange Rate Pass-through 4. The Effects of Vertical Restraints on Exchange Rate Pass-through 4. The Effects of Vertical Restraints on Exchange Rate Pass-through 4. The Effects of Vertical Restraints on Exchange Rate Pass-through
Summary of the results in the preceding section is shown in table 1.   Three
measures of pass-through defined in section 3 are listed with respect to each vertical
structure.   The term “complete” in the cell refers that the corresponding pass-through
is unity; for the exchange rate pass-through, the percentage change in price is equal to
the percentage change in the exchange rate.    The term “incomplete” refers that pass-
through is less than unity.  The relative size of “incomplete” between different
numbers of asterisks can not be uniquely determined. We review our results and
discuss the important implications in the followings.
First, in all cases the pass-through on consumer price is smaller than the pass-
through on wholesale price due to the identity 
W C ε η ε ⋅ =  and 
C ε  being less than one.
This is not the result we emphasize because we admit this is entirely due to the
assumptions.   In fact, we intended to restrict our analysis in this incomplete pass-
through on consumer price case, because this is the casual observation reported in many
cases, e.g., see Gagnon and Knetter (1995).   Our objective is to show that under these
assumptions, which is implying incomplete pass-through on consumer price, the form of
vertical structure could affect the level of pass-through.
Second, the level of pass-through can vary significantly depending upon which
measure of pass-through is chosen.   Only in the case of resale price maintenance, the
exchange rate pass-through on consumer price and wholesale price coincide.  This
implies that researchers must carefully choose correct pass-through measure matched15
for the purpose of research.    If the aim of research is, on the one hand, to determine the
inflationary impact of exchange rate depreciation on domestic price deflator, the
measure of pass-through on consumer price must be chosen.    On the other hand, for
the evaluation of price impact of depreciation on trade balance, data sample must be
taken from the custom report.
Third, we notice that the discretional price setting of vertical integration case, in the
absence of legal restrictions and moral hazards, can make the levels of pass-throughs
for vertical integration to include the levels of pass-throughs for resale price
maintenance and franchising.   From the perspective of explanation described below,
however, we can interpret vertical integration as an intermediate case.
Fourth and the most important implication to the previous literature, the exchange
rate pass-through on wholesale price can be different with respect to various vertical
structures even if the exchange rate pass-through on consumer price are the same.
Considering that original interest in the PTM literature focuses on revealing or
explaining consumer price differentials, measured in common currency, among
countries, the examination of behaviors of exporters based on custom data for their
proxy can be misleading.  For the only exception, Gagnon and Knetter (1995) has
examined retail price for specific models of automobiles to see if subsidiary dealers of
German automobiles in U.S. has shown to absorb additional proportion of changes in
the exchange rate.  They found that German automobile dealers show less pass-
through at retail level than Japanese automobile dealers even if Japanese automobile
manufactures show less pass-through at wholesale level than German automobiles.
( ( ( (i)  i)  i)  i) a linear demand example a linear demand example a linear demand example a linear demand example
Our main results become clearer if we introduce a widely used specific demand form.
We derive exchange rate pass-through elasticity for the cases of two independent firms
and vertically integrated firms with a linear demand function,  qdp =− .  We note
that a linear demand function satisfies our assumption 1 and 2 in section 2.    As an
approximation, we only need to require linearity on demand function to hold locally at
the optimum price level.
Proposition 1. [pass-through elasticities with a linear demand]    With a linear demand
function, vertical integration leads to a higher exchange rate pass-through elasticity of
consumer price.    More precisely, the exchange rate pass-through elasticity of consumer16
price (
C ε ) with vertically integrated firms is equal to the exchange rate pass-through
elasticity of wholesale price (ε
W ).
Proof: See the appendix.
Combining the result of the proposition and the lemmas, we could determine the
exact relationship of exchange rate pass-through in each vertical structure.   Table 2
summarizes the results with a linear demand function.
The first and the second cells in vertically integrated firms column indicates that the
pass-through takes any values within the interval between x and unity.   Since the
wholesale price in vertically integrated firms is just an internal transfer price, it does
not affect the firms’ overall profit in our framework. However, for example, when a
domestic corporate tax is different from the one in a destination country, vertically
integrated firms have strong incentive to take some form of pricing strategy.    The
presence of ad valorem tariff gives another incentive for the firm to choose the lower
level of wholesale price to reduce tax payments.    However, legal requirements prohibit
such pricing behaviors of tax evasion.  Since 
W C ε η ε ⋅ =  and our previous
assumptions of not allowing exchange rate exceeding unity yields the range of pass-
through.
5. More Generalized Frameworks 5. More Generalized Frameworks 5. More Generalized Frameworks 5. More Generalized Frameworks
For the purpose of clear exposition of pure impact of vertical structure on exchange
rate pass-through, we assumed a rather simple vertical structure in which a distributor
is the sole retailer for an imported good.   Rather than a monopolistic retailer, casual
observations of retail markets seem to suggest that there are many distributors for each
imported good.    Therefore, some of us might find it doubtful that the results of this
paper hold for other retail market structures and conclude that, at the best of
interpreting the results of this paper, it reveals the effect of vertical restraints on the
exchange rate pass-through only for the special market structure, namely successive
monopolies.    Nonetheless, in the followings, we argue for the possibility of a wider
applicability of our analysis in international trade.    In fact, it can be shown that our
model of successive monopolies can be extended to cover more generalized frameworks.
First of all, the number of distributors can be extended to infinitely large number of
distributors, which in return implies perfect competition.   If distributors are perfectly17
competitive firms, the consumer price is eventually forced down to equalize with
marginal cost, that is, the wholesale price.  In this perfect competitive case, the
exporter can determine the consumer price through indirect way in contrast with the
direct determination of consumer price in the case of resale price maintenance.    The
distinctive feature in a perfectly competitive distribution market is that the exporter
need not to force distributors to an universal resale price; it is the competitive force of
the market which realizes a universal resale price in consumer market.
Secondly, it is noteworthy that our analysis can be applied to multiple distributors in
limited cases in which the imported market is divided into several spatially separated
markets.   Under the maintained assumption of constant marginal cost, the profit of
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1 ) ( π .    Then, the optimization problem for
the exporter is to choose a price vector instead of a scalar price in the previous analysis.
Proceeding analogously for each market, we obtain the same effects of vertical
restraints on the exchange rate pass-through in each market.    Nevertheless, in a more
complicated case of imperfect market structures, each distributor considers the effect of
its action on the behavior of other distributors.  The analysis, then, requires
oligopolistic framework which integrates the interactions of distributors in downstream
market; straightforward extension of our results obtained from a monopolistic retailer
assumption may not be well applied to the case of oligopolistic retailers.
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Moreover, the bargaining power between the exporter and the distributor can be
easily relaxed for other possible vertical structures.    For example, moving away from
the extreme case of the exporter having all the power, we can examine the case of
bilateral monopolies in which wholesale price must be determined by some process of
bargaining.   Providing the full description of this general case is not the aim of this
paper, however, we give a brief description for one particular case, which has an
important implication especially to the literature of pricing-to-market.
If neither the exporter nor the distributor has the bargaining power, more
appropriately put, when neither firms has the market power, that is perfect competition
in export market, then the export price is solely determined by the domestic market of
exporting country as described in footnote 5.   In this case the exchange rate pass-
through on wholesale price can be shown to be complete because the export price in
                                                  
12    For the general discussions of strategic interactions in retail market, see Tirole
(1988).    Greenhut and Ohta (1979) provides an analysis for successive oligopolies.
Gal-Or (1991) and Bonanno and Vickers (1988) analyze the case for oligopoly
manufactures.18
terms of the exporting country is fixed and the exchange rate pass-through on consumer
price is incomplete with our assumption of demand function.    Moreover, the particular
level of pass-through turns out to be exactly equal to the case of franchising.   The loss
of market power by the exporter results in that the whole rent is captured exclusively by
the distributor.
Lastly, distributors in our analysis do not necessarily refer to retailers in consumer
markets.   As shown in the introductory part of this paper referring to movie industry,
the distribution system may constitutes many layers of distributors.   Then, it is most
likely that the presence of a monopolistic firm in one layer of the distribution system
can introduce the framework of our analysis.    It is likely that the importer with private
information about the quality of imported goods or wholesaler granted with exclusive
dealing in the country, for example, may exhibit the monopoly power.
6. Concluding Remarks 6. Concluding Remarks 6. Concluding Remarks 6. Concluding Remarks
As a result of our successive monopolies model, we obtained without referring to a
specific form of demand function that vertical integration affect export price
determination along vertical structure.    Although the effects of vertical integration on
exchange rate pass-through can not be determined unambiguously without further
specification of demand function, we obtain with a linear demand approximation that
vertical integration increases the degree of exchange rate pass-through on the consumer
price of imported goods.
One strong implication of this result is on the welfare of risk-averse consumers.    On
the one hand, vertical integration improves consumers welfare through eliminating
negative externality between two independent firms and it, therefore, leads to a lower
equilibrium price and a larger quantity.  On the other hand, vertical integration
reduces consumers welfare because consumers must confront higher price variability.
Welfare improvement generated from the vertical integration of successive monopolies
are, therefore, smaller in the international framework in which extremely high volatile
nominal exchange rate dominates the shock of other factors such as production cost
which largely determines the behavior of prices in the local market.
Moreover, we have obtained a testable hypothesis that the exchange rate pass-
through on wholesale price varies with vertical structure whereas the exchange rate
pass-through on consumer price is similar over various vertical structures.  More
precisely, at the consumer price level the price behaviors of exported goods are same for19
any vertical restraints we considered in the paper; only for independent firms the
import price demonstrates a different behavior.    So far empirical studies on pricing-to-
market is mostly conducted with wholesale price of exported goods, which is estimating
ε
W  in our definition, it is recommended that we obtain more empirical evidences on  ε
C
and  η  for more complete understandings of international trade.
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We should also be able to observe a dynamic change in the pass-through elasticity if
the vertical relation of firms changes to another form of vertical relation.    For example,
at the initial stage of entering to a new market in a foreign country, the exporter is very
likely to rely upon the incumbent distribution system in the foreign country.    As the
products of the exporter establishes its substantial share in the foreign market, the
benefit of vertical integration might exceed the cost of vertical integration such as
administrative cost, risk of failure to integrate or a possible future withdrawal from the
foreign market.  Then, exporters might decide on a foreign direct investment in
distribution sector.   As a result we might be able to observe drastic changes in pass-
through, following changes in vertical relation.
The result of this paper implies that conclusions entirely based on the statistical
evidence of pricing-to-market only with custom data are far from complete.   For the
worst, it might lead to misinterpretation of international trade.   For example, it is
possible that we observe complete pass-through at custom level data for one exporter
and incomplete pass-through for another exporter, even if observed pass-through on
retail price for both exporter are the same.    In our simple model, this case refers to the
exporter with franchise distributors and the exporter with distributors under resale
price maintenance.  From the view of conventional wisdom, however, the former
exporter might be labeled as competitive firm and the latter as monopolistic firm.   We
therefore need to be very careful on conducting policy debates based on the empirical
evidence of the previous literature.
Although we assumed a symmetric information structure between the exporter and
the distributor in a static setting without uncertainty, a more realistic model of vertical
structure should include private information of the distributor about the consumer
market and the dynamic framework in which the timing of contracts and realization of
exchange rate become important.   Extending our analysis straightforwardly in this
line must involve the analysis of principal-agent framework in which the exporter
                                                  
13    There are some reports on the values of
C ε , however, the data used for the
estimation of these values are usually consumer price indices which include a large
share of domestic products.20
provides an incentive for the distributor.21
Appendix:
Proof of lemma 1 Proof of lemma 1 Proof of lemma 1 Proof of lemma 1
The first order condition for the distributor is () ' pe pqq W −+ = 0 .  Totally
differentiating this condition, we obtain 0 ' ) ' ' ' ' ' ' ( = − + − + W W dep q dp q q ep q pq .
Rearranging the terms and using assumptions, we obtain
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.    We note that the value of 
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dp
 does not exceed one.    
Since the derived demand is a function of wholesale price denominated in the foreign
currency, its first derivative is qq
dp
depW
'' . =< 0   This proves the first part.  We
remain to prove the last part; the second derivative of the derived demand is non-
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With assumption 2, it is non-negative, therefore, we proved the last part.  Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1 Proof of Proposition 1 Proof of Proposition 1 Proof of Proposition 1
We first specify a linear demand function as q = d - p with profit functions in (1).
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[other vertical structures]    We use the above result and Table 1.22
Figure 1:    Exchange rate pass-through at different stages
Exchange rate pass-through on consumer price
Exchange rate pass-through on wholesale price
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wholesale price for given
cost and exchange rate
A distributor sets a
retail price for given
wholesale price23



























W = η incomplete
(***)













Note: (*) indicates the values of corresponding cells are the same.   “Complete” implies
that pass-through is unity and “incomplete” refers to that pass-through is less than one.
Since ] 1 , 0 [ , ,
W ∈ ⋅ = ε η ε η ε and
W C , 
C ε  is always less than or equal to  ε
W  and  η .
Table 2. Exchange rate pass-through with various forms of vertical structure
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=  .   (In derivation
we used participation constraint, ec-d>0, which implies firms are making positive profit
when producing.)24
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